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The aim of this study is two-fold. Firstly, it attempts to analyse
the effect of risk on Middle East bank’s efficiency levels before and
after the recent financial crisis. Secondly, it seeks to determine
the influence of bank size taking into consideration the possible
inefficiency originated to risk abatement cost. To examine the
aforementioned issues we introduce a risk efficiency index based
on an output orientated directional distance function with weak
and strong disposability assumptions. The methodology has been
applied on a panel data of Middle East banks spanning the period
1998-2014.The empirical findings suggest that on average small
banks are more efficient and their size have less negative impact
on their technical efficiency and risk management. On the other
hand, large banks’ risk management is found to be more flexible
during financial crisis. Finally, banks with higher fixed assets are
associated with more costly dispose of non performing loans jus-
tifying the rejection of a positive relation between bank size and
technical efficiency.
Keywords: Risk efficiency, Middle East banks, Directional distance func-
tion, Metatechnology,
1 Introduction
The last three decades several agreements were singed to create a free
trade zone between European and Mediterranean countries. The Barcelona
Process (1995) created a ”short peace and prosperity zone” while the
Agadir declaration in 2004 aimed to establish a Arab free trade zone.
These agreements were a step forwards the establishment of a common
Arab market creating a more integrated banking system. As a results
deregulation, trade intensification and technological change contributed
to a financial integration process while lead to an increasing competition
in the banking sector leading to a greater risk taking (Casu and Girar-
done,2009).
The 2008 financial crisis, illustrated the leader position of banks in
normal economic development and stability of countries. However, fi-
nancial sector confront some serious challenges to manage the risk taken
with recapitalizations, asset purchases and bad loans specific treatment.
The principal aim of bank management and supervisors is the risk over-
sight, as it is strongly motivated by significant incentives. Financial
firms want to enhance their risk and return trade-offs while regulators
want to avoid systemic risk, the risk that the entire system collapses, as
nearly it did in 2008(Fiordelisi et al.2011). The recent financial crisis
is divided in three phases (Degl’Innocenti et al. 2017). During the sub
prime financial crisis (2007-2008) large losses in mortgage market mobi-
lize authorities to adopt a wide-ranging interventions which seemed to
work effectively. The second phase, global financial crisis (2008-2010), is
generated by the collapse of large US financial institutions and expose
the profound European sovereign debt crisis. Some countries plugged
into a deep recession accompanied by increasing estimates of prospec-
tive banking sector looses on bad loans.Even countries with the best
competitive advantage and growth prospects experience an significant
increase in spreads due to stress in their financial sector in the stage of
sovereign financial crisis (2010-2012), which unrevealed the fragile na-
ture of banking system.
Non performing loans, (hereafter NPLs), is an important factor in
determining normal operational activity of a bank and its profitability.
There are internationally accepted laws which determine the magnitude
of risk that a bank is allowed to take on, and the amount of money
that must be reserved in order to secure the depositors from bank’s
bankruptcy. Basel 1,2,3 states that as higher the risk, which is estimated
by a bank, the amount of money to be reserved increase. Similarly, cap-
ital’s opportunity cost is higher for banks with high risk, employing
suppress in earnings which result in less efficient production. To main-
tain a position in the increasingly competitive and regulated financial
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market banks are forced to operate close to the efficient production. In
this environment a number of studies have focused on the estimation of
bank efficiency accounting for non performing loans (Fukuyama and We-
ber, 2008;2015,Barros et al 2015; Mester, 2007 among others) and find
important discrepancy in results when ignoring the undesirable output.
Other researches emphasize on inefficiency differences attributed to spe-
cific bank characteristics as type (Kontolaimou and Tsekouras, 2010;
Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995), organizational form (Mester, 2007) and
ownership (Chiu et al. 2016). However, studies have not be found to ap-
ply those methods on Middle East banks performance assessments and
none of them try to address the issue of opportunity cost of risk.
The objective of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, it attempts to exam-
ine the influence of risk on banks’ performance in Middle East. Explic-
itly, a common bank production technology is adopted with both strong
and weak disposability of non performing loans. Those hypothesis en-
able to estimate the significance of risk inclusion and the extent of its
influence on banks’ efficiency. Furthermore, the relation of bank size
and efficiency is explored. Secondly, it purports to explore how size spe-
cific technologies affect Middle East banks’ efficiency levels. Specifically,
a common bank technology is presumed, which nests two size specific
technologies, small and large banks technologies, with free and costly
disposability of non performing loans. This enables comparison of inef-
ficiencies arising from bank size and its cost to dispose risk.
Panel data which contains annual balance sheet items on 66 Middle
East banks during 1998 to 2014 is used under intermediation approach,
in an output orientated directional distance function model with non per-
forming loans as bad output. The results suggest that the inclusion of
non performing loans is significant for bank efficiency estimations. More-
over, the size-efficiency link is found to be negative for the Middle East
financial sector. Also, according to data large banks technology is infe-
rior due to lower efficiency from risk management. On the other hand,
small banks are more efficient but, their credit quality management is
sensitive to external economic shocks. This paper addresses these issues
and provide empirical evidence on the unexplored avenues of research.
It specifically contributes to the existing literature on bank performance
three ways.Firstly, the influence of risk inclusion on efficiency estimates is
examined including a proxy for credit quality using directional distance
function approach (DDF) under a DEA framework. While previous pa-
pers mainly focus on bank performance estimated through parametric
methods, they divert their attention from credit quality and size impact
on Middle East financial sector performance. Unlike the previous analy-
sis of Middle East banks efficiency, it attempts to calculate a measure for
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opportunity cost of risk reduction which may give information of banks’
behaviour, specifically interesting to regulators.
The paper unfolds as follows.Section 2 provides an overview of the
related studies in the literature, followed by Section 3 that outlines the
method used. Section 4 presents the choice of input and output variables
for the efficiency model while Section 5 reports our empirical findings.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper offering some policy implications.
.
2 Review of the Literature
A number of empirical studies have investigated the competitive condi-
tions in various banking systems. The majority of these studies conclude
that banks operate in a monopolistic competitive environment (Shaffer,
2002; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Beck, et al., 2006; Mamatzakis et al,
2006; Gutierrez, 2007; Polemis, 2015;Apergis and Polemis, 2016; Aper-
gis et al. 2016). Bank efficiency has been analyzed extensively by many
surveys.Regarding the MENA region, Naceur et al. (2011) examine the
effect of financial-sector reforms on banks performance in selected MENA
countries over the period 1994-2008. They use a meta-frontier approach
to calculate efficiency scores in a cross-country setting. Their analysis
shows that despite similarities in the process of financial reforms under-
taken in the MENA countries, the observed efficiency levels of banks vary
substantially across markets, with Morocco consistently outperforming
the rest countries in the region.
In addition, the evaluation of the relationship between competition
and bank efficiency is rarely found in the MENA region and is mainly
focused on the European Union (EU) countries (Casu and Girardone,
2009; Delis and Tsionas, 2009; Andries and Capraru, 2013; Castellanos
and Garca, 2013; Polemis, 2014). More specifically, Casu and Girardone,
(2009) investigate the relationship between competition and efficiency in
the banking sectors of five EU countries (i.e., France, Germany, Italy,
Spain and the U.K.) over the period 2000-2005 using Granger causality
tests. Their findings indicate that an increase in banks’ monopolistic
power does not translate into a decrease in cost efficiency. Moreover,
they highlight a positive causality between market power and efficiency
levels, running from efficiency to competition in a weak pattern, imply-
ing that increases in efficiency do not foster market power.
Delis and Tsionas (2009), by applying the local maximum likelihood
methodological approach, investigate the relationship between the level
of market power as measured by the Lerner index and cost efficiency in
a sample of European Monetary Union (EMU) countries over the period
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1999-2006.Market power estimates indicate a fairly competitive conduct;
however, heterogeneity in market power estimates is substantial across
banks. They also claim that efficiency and market power are negatively
related, which is in line with the so-called Quiet Life Hypothesis. Ac-
cording to this hypothesis, monopolistic power allows managers to enjoy
a share of the monopoly rents in the form of discretionary expenses
or a reduction of their efforts, leading to the presence of inefficiencies
(Hicks, 1935). In other words, this hypothesis posits that banks enjoy
the advantages of market power in terms of foregone revenues or cost
savings (Delis and Tsionas, 2009). Andries and Capraru (2013) explore
the competition in banking systems in the EU as a whole for the pe-
riod 2004-2010, providing mixed results towards the QLH in terms of
cost and profit efficiency. Furthermore, they find significant evidence to-
wards the validity of the Competition-Inefficiency Hypothesis, denoting
that competition does not lead to a decline in bank efficiency. According
to this hypothesis, higher competition is likely to be associated with less
stable, shorter relationships between customers and banks, amplifying
information asymmetries and requiring additional resources for screen-
ing and monitoring borrowers, resulting in cost inefficiencies.
Castellanos and Garca (2013) study the relationship between the de-
gree of banking competition and the efficiency of the Mexican banking
sector over the period 2002-2012, by employing Tobit regressions. They
use the DEA and the Boone indicator to assess the degree of competition
among other possible determinants of bank efficiency. Their main results
indicate a positive direct relationship between banking competition and
efficiency. Finally, Eisazadeh and Shaeri, (2012) use both Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) and second-stage Tobit regressions to investigate
the impact of institutional and financial factors on banking efficiency in
the case of the MENA countries. They argue that the main drivers of
banking efficiency are related with the macroeconomic stability, the fi-
nancial development and the degree of market openness. Polemis, (2015)
assess the level of banking competition in selected MENA countries.
The analysis employs the estimation of a non structural indicator (H-
statistic) and draws upon a panel dataset of eight MENA countries (Al-
geria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United
Arab Emirates) over the period 1997-2012. The empirical findings are
consistent with other similar studies, providing sufficient evidence in fa-
vor of a banking monopolistic competition regime. This study argues
that, despite similarities in the process of financial regulatory reforms
undertaken in the eight MENA countries, the observed competition lev-
els of banks vary substantially, with Algeria and Morocco consistently
outperforming the rest of the region.
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In a recent paper, Apergis and Polemis, (2016) investigate the re-
lationship between competition and efficiency in the banking sector of
MENA countries spanning the period 1997-2011. To measure the level of
competition, the paper estimates the non-structural indicator known as
the H-statistic, while the level of bank efficiency is estimated through the
non-parametric methodology of the DEA and the Bootstrapped DEA.
They argue that there is a one-way (negative) Granger causality, run-
ning from efficiency to competition.The empirical findings lead to the
rejection of the Efficient Structure Hypothesis, implying that increases
in competition do not precede increases in cost efficiency.
Finally, Bahrini, (2017) analyses the technical efficiency of Islamic
banks in the MENA during the period 2007-2012 by employing a boot-
strap DEA approach. The empirical findings indicate that pure technical
inefficiency was the main source of overall technical inefficiency instead
of scale inefficiency. This finding was confirmed for all MENA Islamic
banks. Furthermore, he claims that MENA Islamic bank managers must
focus more on improving their management practices rather than in-
creasing their sizes. Moreover, financial authorities in MENA countries
must implement several regulatory and financial measures in order to
ensure the development of MENA Islamic banking.
3 Methodological Underpinnings
Our methodological framework is developed in two stages.In the first
stage, we present the theoretical and methodological underpinnings re-
garding the estimation of the directional distance function and risk effi-
ciency measure.In the second stage, we discuss expansion in a metafron-
tier framework presenting the theoretical basis for its inclusion.
3.1 Directional Technology Distance Function and
risk efficiency measurement
To present our methodology we follow closely the works of Chambers et
al.(1996), Chung et al. (1997) and Fare and Grosskopf (2000).Suppose
that a bank employs a vector of inputs x ∈ <K+ to produce a vector of
good outputs y ∈ <M+ , and undesirable outputs b ∈ <N+ .It is assumed
that P (x) is the feasible output set for a given input vector x, and L(y, b)
is the input requirement set for a given output vector (x, b).
The banking technology set can be defined as:
T = {(x, y, b) : x can produce (y, b)} (1)
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The technology is modeled in alternative ways. The output is strongly
and freely disposable if (y, b) ∈ P (x) and (y′ , b′) ≤ (y, b) ⇒ (y′ , b′) ∈
P (x), which implies that if an observed output vector is feasible, then
any output vector smaller than that is also feasible. This assumption
excludes production processes that generate undesirable outputs that
are costly to dispose. For example, regulators concern about risk since
it influence the economical stability of bank ’s operating environment.
On the other hand, managers are worried about the risk taken as it
influence profitability, competitiveness and reputation of a bank.Those
internal and external concerns imply that risk should not be treated as
freely disposable.
In such cases, bad outputs are considered as being weakly disposable:
(y, b) ∈ P (x) and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 ⇒ (ϑy, ϑb) ∈ P (x). This implies that risk
is costly to dispose of and abatement activities would typically divert
resources away from the production of desirable outputs (such as loans
and earnings) and thus lead to lower good outputs with given inputs.
For a bank it means that in order to minimize the risk undertaken, man-
agers have suppress the quantity of given loans, and consequently their
profitability (see Fig.1)1
The directional distance function (hereafter DDF) acts as a repre-
sentation of an multi-input, multi-output distance function.Following
Chambers et al. (1998) and Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2005) we define direc-
tional distance function as:
−→
DFT (x, y, b; gx, gy) =
{
maxβ∗ : (x, y + β ∗ gx, b− β ∗ gy) ∈ T (x, y, b)
}
(2)
Indeed, the DDF projects the input-output vector (x, y) onto the
technology frontier in the (gy,−gb) direction (see fig.1) and allows for
desirable outputs to be proportionally increased, and bad output to be
proportionally decreased. More precisely, it seeks the maximum attain-
able expansion of desirable outputs in direction gy and the largest feasible
contraction of the undesirable outputs in direction gb.
For the estimation of the production technology, parametric and non-
1Figure 1 illustrates how the technology that satisfies the assumption of strong
and weak disposability assumption is constructed.The output set which is bounded
by 0cdef is the technology under strong disposability of bad outputs. The reasons
for the above stated is the absence of reduction in good outputs as the undesirable
outputs are diminished in segment cd and the opposite for the segment ef , while
de is the section of technology where activate best practitioners. As a result, for
cd is assumed strong disposability of bad outputs and in the section ef the same
hypothesis states only for the good outputs. Follows that any try to reduce bad
outputs below the point d recognize the need to either reduce good outputs or to use
more inputs under the non free disposable hypothesis and the output set is described
by 0adef .
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parametric methodologies are available. Of the latter, Data envelopment
analysis (DEA) was used to perform our measures instead of Stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA). DEA is considered an appropriate approach for
measuring performance of decision making units (hereafter DMUs) since
establishing production standards and measuring absolute efficiency in
this setting is hard due to the limited time available (Halkos and Polemis,
2018). The specific estimation of the DDF allows us to estimate the
productive efficiency of each region located at its own country-frontier
suggesting a common frontier or benchmark for their productive perfor-
mance scores. The following linear programming problem, after defining
a particular directional vector, is used to calculate DDF:
−→
DT (x
l∗
n ,y
l∗
n , b
l∗
n ; gx, gy,−gb) = Maxβ>0β (3)
s.t (xl
∗
n − β · gxl
∗
n ) ≥
L∑
l=1
zlxln (4)
(yl
∗
n + β · gyl
∗
n ) ≤
L∑
l=1
zlyln (5)
(bl
∗
n + β · gbl
∗
n ) =
L∑
l=1
zlbln (6)
L∑
l=1
zl = 1, β ≥ 0 (7)
where given l = 1, 2, ..., L the banks examined for each specific techno-
logical set, using a vector of m = 1, 2, ...,M inputs to produce a vector
of m = 1, 2, ...,M desirables and h = 1, 2, ..., H undesirable outputs.
The construction of technology with both strong and weak dispos-
ability assumptions of bad output and the assumption of separability
of good and bad outputs in financial production process (Kumar and
Khanna, 2009) permits for directional distance function to take the
form
−→
D t0,F (y
t, bt, xt) = B(bt)Dt0,F (y
t, xt) where Dt0,F (y
t, xt) is effect of
the ’pure’ technical inefficiency and B(bt) is the effect of undesirable out-
put on technical inefficiency. So following this logic the static measure
of banks’ risk efficiency (BRE) (Kumar and Khanna, 2009) is defined as:
BREF =
(1 +Dt0,F (y
t, bt, xt))
(1 +Dt0,F (y
t, xt)
(8)
By construction, BREF will takes values less than or equal to one. It
represents the extent to which a bank would be constrained in increas-
ing outputs by its potential to transform its production process from free
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disposability to costly disposal of risk. Banks that are less constrained
have a lower opportunity cost of transformation in the production pro-
cess and are considered to be more risk management efficient 2.
3.2 Directional Technology Distance Function un-
der a metatechnology framework
In Middle East countries with L banks each having their specific state
of technology S that belongs to a specific bank system and their own
environmental factors, a metafrontier is defined as the boundary of the
unrestricted technology set. In this case, if technology is freely inter-
changeable and the l-banks have potential access to the same overall
technology we can apply the same DDF to the metafrontier 3. Indeed,
it is not possible to compare banks belonging to different systems tak-
ing into account the case where multiple technologies are possible and
available. Moreover, the reality is that this is not the case and banks
experience some heterogeneity. Relaxing this hypothesis, the notion of
the metafrontier comes into play providing a benchmark for all the par-
ticipating regions irrespective of the frontier to which each belongs.
Hence, given S technologies T 1, T 2, ...T S the metatechnology set, de-
noted as TM , can be defined as the convex hull of the jointure of all
technology sets represented as can produce in at least one of (Rao et
al., 2003) 4 denoting as TM(x)=
{
(y, b) x can produce (y, b)
}
in at least
one of T 1, T 2, ...T S. The output set PM associated with the metate-
2This measure takes a value one only for those countries which are on the seg-
ments de and ef or those banks whose expansions fall on these segments (fig.1).
Moreover, de and ef are common to both technologies with different assumptions
on the disposability of bad outputs. For banks that lie on those segments, the cost
of transforming the production process from strong disposability of bad outputs to
weak disposability of these outputs would be zero. For banks located along the line
segment 0ad, or in the interior part of the weakly disposable output set, the RE in-
dex will assume values less than one, indicating that there is an opportunity cost of
transforming the production process from strong disposability to weak disposability
of bad outputs
3Hayami (1969) and Hayami and Ruttan (1971) were the first to propose the
concept of meta-production distance function as the envelope of commonly con-
ceived neoclassical production functions(pp.134-135). The basic thinking behind
meta-production is to emphasize the heterogeneity of production technology with
different decision-making units (DMUs) to reflect region, type, scale and other in-
herent attributes. All DMUs are then divided into groups according to the different
sources of technological heterogeneity.Each group can form a production frontier, i.e.
a group frontier
4A global frontier that envelopes each of the individual country frontiers or in
other words a basket of available technologies for all industries irrespective of the
country to which each belongs
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chnology is defined in the same way as for a single technology, while
the corresponding efficiency of each region with respect to the homoge-
neous boundary for all heterogeneous regions can be measured by the
output-oriented metatechnical directional distance function defined as
(Eq.3):
−−→
DFM(x, y, b; gx, gy) =
{
maxβ∗ : (x, y + β ∗ gx, b− β ∗ gy) ∈ T (x, y, b)
}
(9)
The corresponding efficiency score is easily obtained by solving an analo-
gous LP problem as in Eq.(2). The boundary of the metafrontier is used
in order that each regional efficiency performance ma be estimated un-
der the hypothesis that technology is freely exchangeable and all regions
have potential access to the same level of the European metatechnology
(Casu et al. 2016).
The introduction of metafrontier analysis as an approach that allows
the investigation of the interrelationships between different technologies
(Battese et al. 2004) can be used in order to explain differences in
production opportunities that can be attributed to available resource
endowments, economic infrastructure, and other characteristics of the
physical, social and economic environment in which production takes
place (ODonnell et al. 2008; Kontolaimou et al. 2012). Moreover, it
accounts for structure of national markets, national regulations and poli-
cies, cultural profiles and legal and institutional frameworks (Halkos and
Tzeremes, 2011), different ownership types (Casu et al. 2013) and differ-
ent rate of access and acceptance of General Purpose Technologies-GPT
(Kounetas et al. 2009). O’Donnell et al. (2008) extended the Battese
et al. (2004) framework using conventional Shepard distance functions
to estimate technical efficiency with respect to the same metatechnology
and several individual technology sets.
Each productive efficiency score obtained from the estimation with
respect to the common technology can be used to define the so-called
metatechnology ratio which is considered a measure of proximity of the
k-th group individual frontier to its metafrontier or in other words how
close a bank system frontier is to the overall (Middle East in our case)
metatechnology (metafrontier). Thus, we can define the following ratio
(O’Donnell et al.2008):
MTR(x, y, b) =
MTE(x, y, b)
TE(x, y, b)
(10)
and identify the technology differential among the Middle East bank
systems.Hence,the technology gap of the i− th bank in the s− th group
frontier is defined as the distance of the group frontier to the metafron-
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tier, weighted with the minimum inputs which are attainable by employ-
ing the group-specific technology,that is:TG(x, y, b) = 1−MTR(x, y, b)
For a bank exhibiting a value equal to zero (or MTR equal to one),
it is evident that the group frontier is tangential to the metafrontier and
hence no efficiency losses are due to inferiority of the group technology
compared to the metatechnology. However productive inefficiency with
respect to the group frontier is still a possible situation. Comparing with
other approaches that considers technology gap as a partially factor of
growth measured as the technological distance from the frontier (Castel-
laci, 2011) in our case technology gap is calculated as the distance of
the specific region to the Middle East metatechnology taking explicitly
into account the distance of the corresponding regions frontier from the
Middle East technology.
Following the analogous formula in Eq.(4) we can define in a analo-
gous way the risk efficiency corresponding to the metatechnology using
the following formula:
BREMF =
1 +Dt0,MF (x
t, yt, bt)/(1 +Dt0,MF (x
t, yt)
1 +Dt0,F (x
t, yt, bt)/(1 +Dt0,F (x
tybt)
(11)
4 Data and variables
Our data comprises of listed banks in nine Middle East countries over
the period 1998 to 2014.Balance-sheet and income statement data were
obtained from Bankscope database. All the variables are expressed in
millions of US dollar. The total number of banks on which the dataset
provide information about are 93 from which 66 are present in every year
during the period in question resulting in a balanced dataset5. More-
over, we limit our analysis to publicly traded commercial banks since the
services they offer are reasonably homogeneous and comparable across
countries, while, they do follow international accounting standards as
well (Naceur et al, 2011, Apergis and Polemis, 2016). After reviewing
the data for reporting errors and other inconsistencies, we obtain a bal-
anced dataset of 1122 observations, which includes a total of 66 different
banks.Furthermore, we proceed in an additional categorization of Middle
East banks according to their size creating two different clusters. Hence,
a bank is classified as large if its total assets are greater than the yearly
median of total assets, and small otherwise (Ariff and Luc,2008; Berger
et al.2005). Such manner of size determination permits movement of
bank between size groups in every year as can be seen from table 16
5The percentage of country participation in the sample along with proportion of
banks which are not present in the whole research period reaches to a maximum 6 %
6No movement between groups of size is observed for 2001, 2010, and 2013 while
in 2004 the higher rhythm of movement is observed, then 9% of small banks become
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Based on the intermediation approach (Berger and Mester, 1997)
inputs and outputs of the financial production process are defined. Ac-
cording to it, banks are considered to act as intermediaries between
savers and investors, transforming deposits and purchased funds into
loans and financial investments. More importantly, costs include both
interest expenses and production costs. However, in the banking litera-
ture several other approaches are used for defining and measuring inputs
and outputs. A theoretical issue which rises a significant argumentation
in the efficiency of banks is the definition of outputs and respectively
inputs of bank production. This misunderstanding seems to fade out
since three approaches to recognize the outputs in financial sector was
defined (Berger and Mester, 1997;Casu and Molyneux,2003). The inter-
mediation approach focuses on the bank’s production of intermediation
services and the total cost of production. It define the outputs to be
banks’ assets of various categories (like loans), while inputs are typi-
cally specified as labor, physical capital, deposits. Asset approach states
that banks are intermediaries in the financial activities, so the assets
and loans are defined as outputs while deposits and liabilities are inputs
User approach define the accounting items as input or output based on
their participation to bank revenue. On the other hand, in value added
approach all the balance sheet items are recognize as outputs, but not
exclusively. So it is assumed that banks use their fixed assets7, effort
from personnel, deposits and sort term funds to produce loans and earn-
ings.Following this idea, fixed assets, personnel expenses, deposits and
short term funds, other operating expenses and deposits are recognized
as inputs.Furthermore, outputs are represented to be net loans8, total
earning assets9 and reserves for impaired loans (NPLs)as the bad ones.
The descriptive statistics of both inputs and outputs are presented
in Table 1 and ensure that as expected, on average, large banks tend
to have higher expenses, profits and risk compared to small. Moreover,
figure 2 illustrate the growth rate of non performing loans for small and
large banks during the period in question. Overall the risk taken by large
banks is more stable compared to small banks. Although in the periods
before and after crisis the risk preferences of small and large banks do
not chances differently, the same is not observed for years 2007 through
large. Although the range of movement is limited and shrunken it gives a more
realistic and time variable approach to the determination of size.
7Fixed assets represents the total value of the tangible assets which can not be
easily liquified.
8Net Loans represents total loans to customers, reduced by possible default losses
and unearned interest income.
9Earning assets include stocks, bonds, income from rental property, certificates of
deposit (CDs) and other interest or dividend earning accounts or instruments
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2010. During the global financial crisis the risk accumulation of banks is
excessive. The quality of small bank assets worsen by almost 60% while
large banks’ risk increase by 20%.
5 Results and discussion
The presentation and discussion of the empirical results follows the struc-
ture of the analysis. The size specific efficiency scores with respect to
the two different groups of Middle East banks are first presented and
discussed. The metatechnology efficiency scores and the associated tech-
nology gaps which arises in the context of the metafrontier are then used
to examine technological spillovers
5.1 Efficiency estimates for small vs big banks
It is assumed that the role of a manager is to maximize the wealth of a
bank, through increment of market share (loans) or profitability (earning
assets) in the simple model. On the other hand, the more realistic spec-
ification describe the role of a manager to be more complicated. He has
to take production decisions that increase loans and earnings but with
the constrain of keeping the risk bank exposure to the lowest possible.
In that environment, it will be interesting to find out which bank
are more efficient in risk constrained management choses. It is pos-
sible through comparing simple and risk adjusted efficiencies of small
and large banks with respect to the common frontier10.Table 2 illustrate
the mean distance (inefficiency) of small and big banks with respect to
common technology frontier under CRS and VRS, with recognizing the
impact of risk on efficiency estimations while the risk efficiency estimate
the impact of NPLs inclusion denoted by risk efficiency. In this section
it is assumed that in Middle East exists only one technology of finan-
cial production and all banks have access to. On average small banks
are closer to the underlying available Middle East technology and this
is revealed with the lower value of distance in all four specifications.
For example, in risk adjusted model, under optimal scale assumption,
from 1998 to 2014, the average small bank in order to be efficient needs
to increase its loans and earnings by 20% and decrease its NPLs (credit
risk) by 20%. However, large banks must expand their market share and
profitability by 22% to be fully efficient.So, higher fixed assets seems to
be related with more inefficiency, revealing a negative link between bank
10Alternatively, heterogeneous frontiers could be assumed but then the comparison
ex post between small and big banks would not be possible (Watanabe and Tanaka,
2007)
13
size and efficiency.
Literature presents contradictory evidence about the correlation sign
of bank size and efficiency. Middle East banking industry show sign of
a negative relation between the amount of fixed assets and performance
during the research period as it was found out. This research output is
in line with other studies(Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki et al.2012; Ataullah et
al. 2004), and seems to agree that complexity and politically determined
bureaucratic organizational structure impede large banks to introduce
new technology and products, while small banks are more flexible to
adapt changes and remain efficient. On the other hand, disagreement
is raising when comparing the results with studies which mention that
large bank ’s market power make them more efficient (Rangan et al.
1988; Yildirim, 2002; Berger, 2007).
Figure 3 offer an illustration of risk efficiency distribution for small
and large banks. In every year the distribution of large banks is at lower
RE values which imply a negative effect of risk management on bank
inefficiency. However, small bank’s asset quality administration tend to
increase their efficiency more in 2006-2008 and 2012-2014. Based on fig-
ure 3 during the financial crisis both small and large banks experienced
a dramatical increase in non performing loans, which means their risk
aversion increase also, but the inefficiency did not decrease. According
to bad luck hypothesis, the increase in risk do not originate to man-
agerial inefficiency but to external shocks (Berger, 2007). On the other
hand, the characteristic positive risk impact on efficiency of banks be-
fore crisis and the following vanishing influence suggest the inability to
reject the cost skimming hypothesis for all banks (Fiordelisi et al.2011;
Koutsomanolli-Fillipaki et al. 2012; Avkiran, 1999)
. Additionally, it was disclosed that more efficiency is attached to
large banks when comparing the ability to both increase loans and earn-
ing while simultaneously decrease the risk. Having in mind the negative
size efficiency link, it can be stated that big banks have an better ability
to diversify their credit risk, because of their market power(Rangan,1998;
Yildirim, 2002; Berger, 2007; Ataullah et al. 2004). This conclusion
demonstrate that the assumptions about risk and efficiency relationship
are not exclusive.
5.2 Metafrontier estimates and technology gaps
In this section, the traditional (considering only desirable) and the risk
adjusted (considering both desirable and undesirable) performance es-
timates are compared. Using output orientated directional distance
function the scaling vector in case of NPLs inclusion is g = (gy, gb) =
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(1, 1,−1) while for the simple model is (1, 1, 0). Both CRS and VRS
scale are considered.Table 3 compares the estimated efficiency levels of
banks in every year assuming strong and weak disposability of bad out-
put.The performance scores was calculated with respect to a common
Middle East frontier. On average, and for every year the simple model
reports higher inefficiencies and lower number of fully efficient banks. As
expected, exclusion of NPLs from the objective function results in un-
derestimated efficiency levels and place banks further from the common
frontier.
Under VRS and CRS assumptions, the two estimates’ distributions of
performance are illustrated to be different (Fig.4). Hence, there is a pos-
sibility that the underlining real technology of financial production does
not permit for analogous expansion of good outputs as the bad output,
because the distances from CRS and VRS differ significantly (Watanabe
and Tanaka, 2007). Ignoring the other assumptions, the specifications
of constant return to scale estimate larger inefficiency compared to vari-
able returns to scale.This conclusion remain valid when reserves for non
performing loans are included or otherwise. It is a confirmation of di-
rectional distance function definition to report lower values of distance
for VRS compared to CRS.
Determining if the omission of NPLs results in biased inefficiency es-
timations, (Mester 1997; Drake and Hale, 2003; Kounetas, 2015), a non
parametric, Mann-Whitney U test was conducted. The null hypothe-
sis of identical population of relative frequency distribution of models
including bad outputs and ignoring them is rejected. For both scale as-
sumptions there seems to be a difference between the resulting distances
from technology frontier when omitting and including risk, with differ-
ence being statistically significant as can be seen from table 4.
In addition, Table 4 shows the estimated values for risk efficiency for
every year and different scale assumption. On average, in none of the
years banks were fully risk efficient implying the existence of risk min-
imization opportunity cost. Optimal scale specification of the output
orientated directional distance function report a loan and earning sacri-
fice of 10% for a proportional reduction of risk, for both small and large
banks, while VRS model imply that a 1% reduction in banking activity
is enough to reduce the cost.Turning the attention to yearly averages,
there is observed that in some years small banks have higher constrains
to reduce the risk and in others large banks’ inefficiency is not reduced
by the produced mix of outputs. If the risk efficiency measure is inter-
preted as an opportunity cost of risk diminished then it can be stated
that large banks have higher constrains to increase their asset quality.
For example, in 2004 an average bank in order to adopt a more secure
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strategy was necessary to renounce almost 25% of their market share
and profits which is quite useful for supervisors.
It was expected that precluding undesirable outputs from DDF re-
sults in biased estimates of the technical efficiency due to the model
incapability to describe the true production process. The research con-
clusions about the influence of bad outputs on efficiency estimates are
in the same line with the theory (Stigler, 1976) and consistent to the
existing literature (Kounetas, 2015; Watanabe and Tanaka, 2007; Ku-
mar 2009), which also point that the preclusion of bad loans conduct
to overestimated inefficiencies and is explained by the lack of rewarding
DMUs for succeeding controlling NPLs level.
In this section, also, it is attempted to explore what amount of in-
efficiency is generated by the size alternative technology. Furthermore,
the risk management inefficiency which emerges form the size specific
production technology is investigated. To proceed towards, the efficien-
cies with respect to size specific frontier and to the common frontier
are estimated. It is presumed that large and small banks have differ-
ent technologies, and concomitantly have access to a common Middle
East bank technology production. Afterwards the metatechnology ratio
calculated. Motivated by the bias produced when NPLs are excluded,
previous approximated risk adjusted efficiencies are employed for MTR
evaluation.Then BRE of size specific frontiers and common frontier are
used to define the metatechnology risk efficiency ratio. The results of
average MTR and REMTR of small and large banks are presented in
table 5.
MTR express how close is the size specific frontier to the common
underlying technology. It has the ability to identify technology differen-
tials among size banking system.To remind, as higher the value of MTR
as less inefficient is the adopted technology (small or large).Small banks
have higher MTR in all model specifications, indicating more advanced
technology selection compared to large banks.Explicitly, if large banks
would adopt the available Middle East technology, they could be efficient
with a 6% lower change in the outputs (reducing risk and increasing loans
and earnings) while keeping their input mix stabile. In the same man-
ner, small banks efforts for efficient output strategy would be minimized
by 2.5% (CRS model).In other words, less inefficiency is arising from the
management and operational processes, which determine the technology,
adopted by small banks.Information about the time trend and distribu-
tion of MTR of small and big banks are illustrated in figure 5 for optimal
and variable scale assumption. Small bank ’s technology is closer to the
available Middle East production frontier before financial crisis.Starting
with 2007, large banks follow closely the common technology, while it
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seems to be a difficult task for their smaller counterparts.Although CRS
expose the flexibility of large banks to adapt more efficiently to riskier
environment, VRS model present small banks’ technology to be more
efficient in every year.Based on metatechnology ratios described in table
5, the same distribution of small and large banks by year is tested using
the non parametric Mann Whitney test on MTRs estimations. The re-
sults of the test are presented in table 6 and point out that technology
configurations are statistically important factors in efficiency determina-
tion.
Several conclusions about bank size and efficiency can be drown from
the results presented in this section. Firstly, on average small bank tech-
nology of Middle East is more efficient, but is accompanied with more
sensibility to external shocks. Macroeconomic events, like financial crisis
which started in 2007 seems to increase the inefficiency of small bank
production, meaning that the chosen output combination of risk, loans
and earnings are further than the possible ones if optimal return to scale
characterize the technology. On the other hand, inferiority of large banks
technology before crisis period became superior to small bank ’s technol-
ogy during crisis. Affirmation of earlier literature engage the obtained
results that find efficiency decrease as the main source of bank ’s pro-
ductivity and competitiveness losses Berger, 2007;Ataullah et al. 2004;
rangan,1998). Furthermore, as claimed by ”bad luck” hypothesis, the
higher inefficiency of small banks does not mean that the managers are
not efficient. It is logical to say that, if small banks has a more diversi-
fied risk and a higher influence in market, then it could be more efficient
during the macroeconomic shocks.On the other hand, the before crisis
larger inefficiency of big financial institutions may be explain by either
the cost skimming or the moral hazard hypothesis.
Finally,the results of risk efficiency metatechnology ratio are pro-
vided in table 5 which gives some valuable information on opportunity
cost of risk which is due to size specific technology.On average small
banks technology is superior, since only 2% reduction in sacrificed mar-
ket share and profitability will be necessary if small banks’ frontier were
absolutely the same as available Middle East technology. Nevertheless,
large banks frontier appears to be further from the efficient cost disposal
of risk.On average, large banks renounce from more desirable outputs to
increase the asset quality. If those banks adopt the common technology
they will earn a 4% on loans and profitability spare.To determine the
time trend and explore in more depth the behavior of risk efficiency ratio
with respect to metafrontier a distribution graph is provided in figure
6. In every year and under variable to scale assumption small banks
have the same risk opportunity cost with respect to both frontier and
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metafrontier.Every small bank in 2004, 2005, and 2007 does not have ad-
ditional charge originated by its supressed size. This is true also for CRS
assumption in 2004 while in the rest years slightily higher contraction of
banks activity is required to avoid risk under homogeneity assumption,
but it does not exceed the five percent. So large banks are by 4% more
inefficient due to their adopted technology of risk management.
Figure 6 highlights the inefficient risk management, due to the in-
flexibility of big banks to adopt their activities to risk management de-
velopment. It could be explained by the impersonal interaction between
lenders and borrowers in significantly large finacial institutions koutso-
manoli2012profit. Additionally, the benefits from diversification of risk
could be exploited even more, and higher levels of efficiency could be
approached. On the other hand, the risky enviroment of crisis has ob-
ligated large banks to adopt more effective credit monitoring systems.
Contrary, small banks have more beneficial reaction on their technical
efficiency due to they technology process to manage risk. This could
be explained by their minor market share which permits them to moni-
tor credit better and to exploit benefits from soft information processes
(Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995).
6 Conclusions
Bank efficiency seems to be one of the most important assets for banks
and is given priority in recent decades, because banks operate in an ex-
tremely competitive environment where survival has become uncertain.
This paper had stressed the impact of risk preferences and size on Mid-
dle East bank performance.For this purpose, it was assumed that the
financial production is characterized by both free and costly risk abate-
ment, which enable the identification of inefficiency due to risk man-
agement.Furthermore, a meta-production model is adopted to identify
inefficiency attributed to bank size. An output orientated directional
distance function was employed under intermediation approach. Using
accounting data on 66 Middle East banks for 1998 to 2014 period, banks’
efficiencies were estimated with DEA method.
The evidence from this study points towards the idea of biased effi-
ciency estimations resulting from models which omit bank ’s risk pref-
erences. In the same line with relative literature, ignorance of bad loans
gives overestimated inefficiency, and lower number of decision making
units being fully efficient. Furthermore, the difference of risk adjusted
and simple inefficiency was found to be statistically significant. Besides
the technical inefficiency of Middle East banks, it was demonstrated that
non performing loans have a positive effect on bank efficiency.
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The findings suggest that small banks are closer to the underlying
common Middle East technology when non performing loans are included
in the model. The persistence of such observation during the examined
period conduct to the conclusion of a negative relation between size and
efficiency of banks. Although large banks’ risk preferences have elevated
effect on efficiency, they are more inefficient compared to smaller coun-
terparts. Furthermore, the investigation of inefficiency attributed to
bank size unrevealed the technological inferiority of large banks which is
associate with bad management. On the other hand, small banks tech-
nology is closer to the common available Middle East frontier during the
research period, excepting 2008 to 2010. This accentuate the idea of bad
luck hypothesis and highlight the sensibility of small banks to external
economic shocks.
Finally, the results on risk efficiency metatechnology ratio indicate
that on average, production inferiority of large banks are ascribed to
their low-quality management of non performing loans.Interestingly, dur-
ing financial crisis the risk abatement cost of large banks is closer to the
efficient, which can be explained by the benefits of risk diversification.
Contrary, having a lower market share and less diversified risk, small
banks face difficulties to adapt their cost of risk reduction to the effi-
cient. However, sacrifice of market share and earnings are not very high,
implying more personal relation with borrowers and effective process of
soft information for small bank ’s management.
Possible policy implications of our study for bank management and
regulation are as follows. Since the average large bank ’s technical inef-
ficiency is attributed to poor risk management, it is beneficial for large
banks to develop a better process of monitoring possible costumers. Also,
the results indicate that bank size measured by total assets has a neg-
ative effect on technical efficiency. This suggests that consolidation of
large banks in the region must be controlled in order to lower technical
inefficiency in banking. Moreover, since bank efficiency measures the
performance of a bank relative to the performance of a best-practice
bank, ranking the banks this way is feasible and useful for the govern-
ment policy by showing inter alia the effects of deregulation or mergers.
Furthermore, in terms of research purposes measuring properly bank ef-
ficiency is crucial in order to identify the best and worst practices in
order to improve managerial performance
The above findings are valuable for market players (banks, regula-
tors, investors and policy makers) in their attempt to understand what
are the main driving forces of bank efficiency in the MENA region. From
a policy perspective, the results of this study support the notion of gov-
ernments toward a deeper revision of regulatory and competition policies
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in the MENA banking sector. For this reason, policy makers and regu-
lators should opt for reforms that restrict anti-competitive practices (i.e
abuse of dominance, cartel agreements, vertical restraints, etc) while in
parallel enhance ex-ante the level of effective competition by assessing
the disruptive effects of mergers and acquisitions. Owing to its limita-
tions, the research could be extend in a variety of ways.The scope of this
study could be further extended to investigate the country and owner-
ship inefficiencies. Second, it is suggested that further analysis to be
undertaken in the investigation of bias which the accounting strategy of
banks impose.Third, future research into the efficiency of the banking
sector could also consider the to decompose the internal and external
risk inefficiency. Finally, result comparison with an investigation based
on a larger data and determining the size of bank based on market share
and profitability, would be interesting.
Despite these limitations, the findings of this study are expected to
contribute significantly to the existing knowledge of the operating perfor-
mance of banking industry in the Middle East countries. Nevertheless,
the study has also provided further insight into the banks size efficiency
relation, as well as the policy makers with regard to attaining stability in
systemic risk. Additionally, directions for technical efficiency improve-
ments through more personal credit monitoring facilitate sustainable
competitiveness banking operations in the future.
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Table 1: Summary statistics by size of inputs and outputs during 1998-
2014
Total
Average Min Max Large Small
Input
Fixed Assests 144766.7 705 1071569 255721.9 33811.5
(197220) ( 229069) (26871)
Personal Expenses 134256.3 846 1569865 236197 32315.67
(217500) (270170) (29745)
Operating Expences 98634.91 1128 1070198 174044.4 23225.45
(156779) (193178) (22100)
Deposits 1180×104 72355 10900×105 2020×104 3299077
(1580×104) (1850×104) (3834010)
Output Total Min Max Large Small
Earning Assets 1229×105 118336 1220×105 2210×104 3650806
(17504) (2050×104 ) (4419165 )
Net Loans 8156390 59661 9290×105 1420×104 2126903
(12404) (1520×104 ) (2731436)
Impaired Loans 322594.9 722 3265427 528509.7 116680.2
(465709) (563498 ) (177973)
Note: The column ”Average” , ”Min” and ”Max” present statistical measures of
overall sample. The last two columns report the mean inputs and outputs for Large
and small banks, respectively.
APPENDIX A
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Table 2: Efficiency and risk efficiency by banks size and year
Efficiency Risk Efficiency
VRS CRS VRS CRS
Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large
1998 0.231 0.247 0.004 0.024 0.934 0.935 0.999 0.999
1999 0.216 0.264 0.005 0.026 0.800 0.774 0.999 0.995
2000 0.173 0.170 0.026 0.005 0.955 0.939 0.999 0.998
2001 0.170 0.179 0.005 0.022 0.890 0.859 0.999 0.999
2002 0.093 0.126 0.004 0.029 0.918 0.896 0.999 0.999
2003 0.152 0.217 0.004 0.034 0.908 0.871 0.999 0.998
2004 0.197 0.227 0.006 0.035 0.814 0.769 0.999 0.999
2005 0.306 0.399 0.005 0.038 0.927 0.947 0.998 0.990
2006 0.246 0.310 0.006 0.041 0.946 0.967 0.997 0.987
2007 0.269 0.258 0.008 0.052 0.951 0.938 0.997 0.986
2008 0.197 0.194 0.009 0.058 0.936 0.950 0.998 0.992
2009 0.235 0.241 0.009 0.073 0.877 0.884 0.998 0.987
2010 0.242 0.223 0.011 0.073 0.882 0.894 0.997 0.990
2011 0.204 0.252 0.010 0.105 0.886 0.893 0.997 0.981
2012 0.188 0.201 0.012 0.129 0.923 0.953 0.997 0.979
2013 0.161 0.205 0.011 0.129 0.927 0.973 0.997 0.990
2014 0.166 0.160 0.013 0.096 0.932 0.962 0.998 0.993
Mean 0.199 0.228 0.007 0.058 0.906 0.906 0.998 0.992
St.dev 0.177 0.157 0.011 0.096 0.101 0.086 0.003 0.002
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.411 0.522 0.965 0.695
Max 0.791 0.848 0.070 0.748 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 3: Comparison between models with and without undesirable out-
put.
With Undesirable output Without Undesirable output
CRS VRS CRS VRS
Mean Efficiency Efficient Mean Efficiency Efficient Mean Efficiency Efficient Mean Efficiency Efficient
1998 0.239 14 0.014 13 0.330 4 0.014 11
1999 0.240 12 0.015 16 0.628 7 0.018 10
2000 0.145 13 0.015 16 0.215 5 0.016 12
2001 0.174 13 0.013 16 0.357 4 0.014 11
2002 0.109 12 .017 15 0.229 6 0.017 13
2003 0.184 16 0.019 16 0.347 5 0.020 11
2004 0.212 11 0.020 12 0.550 2 0.021 9
2005 0.352 7 0.022 17 0.450 2 0.028 12
2006 0.278 11 0.023 19 0.338 4 0.031 12
2007 0.263 9 0.030 18 0.340 3 0.039 13
2008 0.195 13 0.033 22 0.271 6 0.038 18
2009 0.238 9 0.041 18 0.413 4 0.049 14
2010 0.233 10 0.042 15 0.393 3 0.048 10
2011 0.228 9 0.057 15 0.389 2 0.070 8
2012 0.194 12 0.070 18 0.285 5 0.085 11
2013 0.183 14 0.070 22 0.257 6 0.076 14
2014 0.163 16 0.054 22 0.234 6 0.059 14
Table 4: Results of Mann Whitney tests concerning the efficiency differ-
ences between models with and without undesirable output
Year CRS VRS
1998 3.365 (0.008) 4.361 (0.001)
1999 6.057 (0.000) 4.274 (0.000)
2000 3.550 (0.000) 3.563 (0.000)
2001 5.249 (0.000) 3.634 (0.000)
2002 4.309 (0.000) 4.871 (0.000)
2003 6.812 (0.000) 6.651 (0.000)
2004 2.062 (0.037) 6.700 (0.000)
2005 2.653 (0.003) 4.311 (0.000)
2006 2.415 (0.0015) 4.345 (0.000)
2007 2.584 (0.009) 2.961 (0.000)
2008 4.863 (0.000) 3.531 (0.000)
2009 5.277 (0.000) 4.720 (0.000)
2010 5.363 (0.000) 4.851 (0.000)
2011 5.222 (0.000) 5.342 (0.000)
2012 2.363 (0.003) 4.080 (0.000)
2013 4.207(0.000) 4.862 (0.000)
2014 2.637 (0.008) 3.999 (0.000)
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Table 5: Metatechnology ratio and risk efficiency metatechnology ratio
by banks’ size and year.
Metatechnology Ratios Risk Efficiency Ratios
CRS VRS CRS VRS
Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large
1998 0.999 0.871 0.999 0.987 0.998 0.988 0.999 0.997
1999 0.999 0.877 0.999 0.985 0.999 0 .829 0.999 0.999
2000 0.997 0.947 0.999 0.992 0.994 0.994 0.999 0.999
2001 0.998 0.925 0.999 0.993 0.983 0.923 0.999 0.999
2002 0.989 0.977 0.998 0.992 0.973 0.992 0.999 0.999
2003 0.991 0.938 0.999 0.983 0.974 0.977 0.999 0.999
2004 0.977 0.944 0.999 0.981 1.000 0.823 1.000 0.994
2005 0.999 0.848 0.999 0.988 0.999 0.976 1.000 0.994
2006 0.997 0.908 0.999 0.985 0.996 0.991 0.999 0.993
2007 0.948 0.947 0.997 0.984 0.974 0.989 1.000 0.999
2008 0.960 0.981 0.999 0.984 0.979 0.996 0.999 0.999
2009 0.959 0.966 0.999 0.978 0.967 0.979 0.999 0.999
2010 0.967 0.946 0.998 0.980 0.997 0.961 0.999 0.996
2011 0.968 0.940 0.999 0.970 0.994 0.949 0.999 0 .998
2012 0.930 0.994 0.998 0.975 0.989 0.991 0.999 0.996
2013 0.948 0.985 0.999 0.979 0.985 0.995 0.999 0.998
2014 0.954 0.988 0.999 0.984 0.989 0.996 0.999 0.993
Average 0.975 0.940 0.999 0.983 0.988 0.962 0.999 0.998
Std. dev 0.035 0.064 0.002 0.018 0.023 0.067 0.000 0.000
Min 0.819 0.628 0.959 0.855 0.822 0.608 0.988 0.925
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 6: Results of Mann Whitney tests concerning the Technological
gap differences of under the year specific technologies and metatechnol-
ogy
Year CRS VRS
1998 4.596 (0.000) 4.203 (0.001)
1999 4.969 (0.000) 4.537 (0.000)
2000 3.200 (0.000) 3.241 (0.000)
2001 3.554 (0.000) 5.554 (0.000)
2002 4.147 (0.000) 3.127 (0.000)
2003 6.162 (0.000) 4.232 (0.000)
2004 6.676 (0.000) 3.756 (0.000)
2005 4.377(0.000) 4.201 (0.000)
2006 4.627(0.000) 4.368 (0.000)
2007 2.961(0.000) 2.967 (0.000)
2008 3.948(0.000 3.861 (0.000)
2009 4.708(0.000) 5.706 (0.000)
2010 4.558(0.000) 3.957 (0.000)
2011 5.222(0.000) 5.101 (0.000)
2012 4.718(0.000) 3.578 (0.000)
2013 4.983(0.000) 4.601 (0.000)
2014 3.789(0.000) 3.002 (0.000)
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Figure 1: Output sets for strongly and weakly disposable bad outputs,
and directional output distance function
APPENDIX B
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Figure 2: Mean growth of non performing loans by year for small and
large banks
Figure 3: Risk efficiency distribution of small and large banks with re-
spect to common technology.
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Figure 4: Performance distributions of simple and risk adjusted model
for by year.
Figure 5: Metatechnology ratio distribution for size groups.
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Figure 6: Distribution of risk efficiency metatechnology ratio by year
and bank size.
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